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Abstract:

we introduce a generalization of

Independence Friendly (IF)

logic in which Eloise is restricted to a nite amount of information about
Abelard's moves. This Logic is shown to be equivalent to a sublogic

∃∀

of

rst order logic, has the nite model property, and is decidable. Moreover,
it gives an exponential compression relative to

∃∀

logic.

Partial information logic is a generalization of both rst order logic and
Hintikka-Sandu [3] IF-logic. We motivate this logic by means of an example.

M on some domain D and some formula A =
(∀x)(∀y)(∃z)R(x, y, z) where R is atomic. Then to this formula corresponds a

Suppose we have a model

game between two players Abelard and Eloise. Abelard chooses two elements

a, b from D. Then Eloise chooses a third element c from D. If the formula
R(a, b, c) holds in M then Eloise has won, else Abelard has. Now it can be
shown that the formula A is true in M i Eloise has a winning strategy.
The game as we have just desribed tells us how classical rst order logic

B be the variant
B = (∀x)(∀y)(∃z/x)R(x, y, z). Now the game
proceeds as before with Abelard choosing a, b and Eloise choosing c, but
now, the choice of c has to be independent of a because the quantier ∃z has
now been marked by a /x, indicating independence of x, or as we might say,
ignorance of x.

works. To look at IF-logic we consider a slight variant. Let
of

A

obtained by writing

But we could just as easily say that Eloise's knowledge is restricted to the
value of

y,

i.e. to

b.

Instead of concentrating on what Eloise does

we concentrate on what she

does .

not

Similar restrictions might of course apply

to Abelard in case he too has a move which follows the move of Eloise.
∗
†
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Now we introduce an innovation which will turn out to be interesting.

x,

IF-logic allows Eloise to know the value of
Could we consider other possibilities?

E.g.

y

or of

suppose

might restrict Eloise to know the value of their

sum.

or of both or neither.

x, y

are integers.

We

Or for another example,

suppose you meet on the airplane an attractive woman who tells you only
her rst name (until she knows you better). Now if

x

is the name variable

whose value is Eloise Dzhugashvili and she only tells you `Eloise', then you
do not know

x

but neither are you ignorant of it. You know it

in part .

This opens up the possibility of more general kinds of knowledge of the
values of variables than allowed by IF-logic and we will see that it leads to
interesting possibilities.
As usual we have variables, predicate symbols, certain special function
symbols. Atomic formulas are dened as usual. Literals are atomic formulas
or their negations. For simplicity we will apply negation only to atoms.

Denition 1 1 Literals are formulas of PI.
2a If ϕ( x, y) is a formula of PI and f is one of the special function symbols,
→

→

then (∃y//f (→x ) )ϕ( x, y) is a formula of PI.

2b If ϕ( x, y) is a formula of PI and f is one of the special function symbols,
→

→

then (∀y//f (→x ) )ϕ( x, y) is a formula of PI.

3a If ϕ( x), θ( x) are formulas of PI then ϕ( x) ∨//f (→x ) θ( x) is a formula of PI.
→

→

→

→

3b If ϕ( x), θ( x) are formulas of PI then ϕ( x) ∧//f (→x ) θ( x) is a formula of
→

→

→

→

PI.

Intuitively, the
restriction

//f (→
x)

∃y

in

→

(∃y//f (→
)ϕ( x, y) is Eloise's move but because of the
x)

she only knows

→

f ( x)

when she makes her move. We may,

more generally, allow her also to know the values of two or more functions f, g
→
of x so that in the extreme case she could know all the projection functions
→
and hence know x precisely. That case corresponds to our usual rst order

some

logic. In an intermediate case, she could know
of the projection func→
→
tions on x , i.e. some but not all of the variables in x . That case corresponds
to IF-logic.
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In

→

(∀y//f (→
)ϕ( x, y)
x)

similar way.
Let us consider

the move is Abelard's and he too is restricted in a

→

→

ϕ( x) ∨//f (→
θ( x).
x)

Since we have a disjunction here, it is

for Eloise to choose which of the two formulas ϕ, θ to play. But when she
→
chooses, she only knows the value f ( x) or perhaps more than one such value,
→
but her knowledge of x might not be complete.
→
→
On the other hand, in ϕ( x) ∧ /
/f (→
θ( x) the move is Abelard's but the
x)
restrictions are similar to those in 3a above.
Compositional sematics can be dened for PI in just the same way as they
have been dened for IF-logic by Hodges [4, 5], Väänänen [10], etc. Moreover
PI-logic can be interpreted into second order logic in the same way.

f
a, b

Now we come to a special kind of PI-logic where the special functions
allow only a

nite

amount of information about the arguments. Thus if

are integers and Eloise has to make a choice based on them, she might be

a < b or whether a + b is odd, or whatever.
a, b or even of a + b is out of the question.

allowed only to know whether
Knowing the precise value of

Why consider such a restricted case? We have two reasons. One is that
this special case of PI-logic which we shall call FI-logic, or

logic

nite information

has very elegant logical properties. The other is that since quantiers

correspond to moves in games, the games which FI-logic represents arise all
the time in social algorithms and are deeply related to how social human
interations work.
For example a passport ocial at an airport only wants to know whether
you have a valid visa or not.

If you do, she lets you in, if not, she sends

you back on the next ight. Or perhaps she classies you among four classes,
those who are citizens, those who come from friendly countries whose citizens
do not require a visa, those who have a visa, and the remaining who are the
ones sent back. In any case she only wants a nite amount of information
about the variable, namely you.
Or a young man looking for a date might want to know if the prospective
date is blonde or brunette. If she is, he is not interested, he wants to date
brown hair only. If she does have brown hair, he wants to know if she is tall.
If not, he is again not interested. So he seeks a nite amount of information
about the prospective date. Naturally she may have similar questions about
him. But each will seek only a nite amount of information.
We repeat the denitions which we had above for formulas of PI-logic,
indicating where the dierence arises between PI-logic in general and its
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special case, FI. Since only a nite amount of information is available at each
step, it could easily be represented by one or more booleans, i.e. by formulas.
Thus our special functions

f

drop out. Our main result is Theorem 8 which

says that every consistent FI-sentence has a nite model. We use a strong
form of this result to show that FI is exactly the existential-universal fragment
of rst order logic, if considered as a classical logic. However, FI is actually
a non-classical logic with a rich many-valued semantics (this aspect will not
be pursued in this paper).

The reduction to rst order logic is non-trivial

in the sense that there is a trade-o: the rst order expression seems to be
exponentially longer than its FI representation.
In this section we dene the

nite information logic

FI and discuss its

semantics. It turns out that it makes sense to pay attention to what kind of

θ

we allow in

//θ ,

as the following informal result demonstrates:

Lemma 2 The following conditions are intuitively equivalent in any model
A with at least two elements, whatever sentence θ is:

1. A |= (∀x)(∃y//(x=c∨θ) )(y 6= x).
2. A |= ¬θ

Proof. Suppose θ is true and ∃ knows it. Then the information that
(x = c ∨ θ) is true tells ∃ nothing about x. Also the information that
(x = c ∨ θ) is false tells nothing because this information is impossible, i.e.
never given in this case. Thus in this case ∃ cannot possibly have a winning
strategy for choosing y 6= x. On the other hand, suppose θ is false and
∃ knows it. Then she can make the following inference: If I am told that
(x = c ∨ θ) is true, I know that it is true because x = c, and then I know
what x is. If I am told that (x = c ∨ θ) is false, I know it is because x 6= c,
and I can choose y = c.

In the proof we used the assumption that although the information that

∃

has is limited as to the values of the variables,

∃

things. For example, it follows that if
what it is. Also, if it is known that

¬θ

∃

knows generally known

has a winning strategy, she knows

(in a given model), then

∃

knows it

too.
Lemma 2 shows that if we allow
the negation of

θ.

θ

in

//θ ,

we are committed to have also

On the other hand, games of imperfect information may

very well be non-determined. Therefore we should be cautious with negation.
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In social software it seems that the information we use in decisions is
often atomic (man, woman) or existential (has a ticket, has a visa,
which is valid) or boolean combinations of such (is retired or has exactly
three children). Accordingly we start by allowing

θ

in

//θ

to be any boolean

combination of existential formulas.

Denition 3 The set of formulas of FI is dened as follows:
(1) Atomic and negated formulas are FI-formulas.
(2) If ϕ(~x) and ψ(~x) are FI- formulas and θ(~x) is a boolean combination of
existential formulas, then

ϕ(~x) ∧//θ(~x) ψ(~x)

and
ϕ(~x) ∨//θ(~x) ψ(~x)

are FI-formulas.

(3) If ϕ(~x, y) is an FI-formula and θ(~x) is a boolean combination of existential formulas, then

(∀y//θ(~x) )ϕ(~x, y)

and
(∃y//θ(~x) )ϕ(~x, y)

are FI-formulas.
We now dene semantics for FI. Suppose
functions

s

A

is a model and

X

is a set of

such that

(1) dom(s) is a nite set of variables
(2) s, s0 ∈ X =⇒ dom(s) = dom(s0 )
(3) ran(s) ⊆ A.
Intuitively

X

is a set of plays i.e. assignments of values to variables. To

incorporate partial information we have to consider sets of plays rather than
mere individual plays.
where

θ(~x)

X = X0 ∪ X1
s, s0 ∈ X

A partition

is rst-order, if for all

is

θ(~x)-homogeneous,

(A |=s θ(~x) ⇐⇒ A |=s0 θ(~x)) =⇒ (s ∈ X0 ⇐⇒ s0 ∈ X0 ).
5

Let

X[a : y] = {(s\{hy, bi : b ∈ A}) ∪ {hy, ai} : s ∈ X}
X[A : y] = {s ∪ {hy, ai} : s ∈ X, a ∈ A}.
We dene the concept

A |=X ϕ
for

ϕ ∈ FI

as follows:

(S1) A |=X ϕ i A |=s ϕ for all s ∈ X , if ϕ is atomic or negated atomic.
(S2) A |=X ϕ(~x) ∧//θ(~x) ψ(~x) i A |=X ϕ(~x) and A |=X ψ(~x). (θ(~x) plays no
role)

(S3) A |=X ϕ(~x) ∨//θ(~x) ψ(~x)
X0 ∪ X ,

such that

A |=X0 ϕ(~x)

(S4) A |=X (∃y//θ(~x) )ϕ(~x, y)
X0 ∪ X , and y1 , y2

i there is a
and

θ(~x)-homogeneous
A |=X1 ψ(~x).

partition

X =

θ(~x)-homogeneous partition X =
A |=X0 [y1 :y] ϕ(~x, y) and A |=X1 [y2 :y] ϕ(~x, y).

i there is a

such that

(S5) A |=X (∀y//θ(~x) ))ϕ(~x, y) i
A |=X[A:y] ϕ(~x, y)
(θ(~
x) plays no role).
There is an asymmetry between

∧//θ(~x)

and

∨//θ(~x)

on one hand and be-

(∀y//θ(~x) ) and (∃y//θ(~x) ) on the other hand. This is because in this paper
we consider truth from the point of view of ∃ only, i.e. classically. Thus we
are concerned about the knowledge that ∃ has. As ∃ has to be prepared to
play against all strategies of ∀, ∃ has to consider also the case that ∀ plays
tween

"accidentally" with perfect information. If we considered FI non-classically
the symmetry would be preserved.
Suppose

A |={∅} ϕ. Now ∃ has a winning strategy in the obvious semantic
∃ plays she keeps A |=X ϕ and the play ∈ X true. More

game, namely, while
exactly:

(G1)

Suppose we are at an atomic or negated atomic formula

A |=X ϕ

and the play is in

X, ∃

wins by (S1).
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ϕ.

Since

(G2)

(S2) to

(G3)

(G4)

ϕ(~x) ∧//θ(~x) ψ(~x). Now ∀
conclude A |=X ϕ(~
x).

We are at

ϕ(~x).

We use

We are at ϕ(~
x) ∨//θ(~x) ψ(~x). We can by (S3) divide X = X0 ∪ X1 in a
θ(~x)-homogeneous way and A |=X0 ϕ(~x) and A |=X1 ψ(~x). The play is
in X so it is in one of X0 and X1 , but ∃ does not know in which. We
let ∃ make the choice on the basis of the following inference. If θ(~
x) is
0
0
true and some ~
x in X0 satises θ(~x ), then she chooses X0 . In this
case homogeneity gives ~
x 0 ∈ X0 and we also have A |=X0 ϕ(~x). If θ(~x)
0
is true and some ~
x in X1 satises θ(~x 0 ), then she chooses X1 . Again
homogeneity gives ~
x 0 ∈ X1 and we also have A |=X1 ϕ(~x). Similarly,
if θ(~
x) is false and some ~x 0 in X0 satises θ(~x 0 ), then she chooses X1 ,
otherwise X0 .
We are at
so far is in

(G5)

plays choosing, say,

(∀y//θ(~x) ))ϕ(~x, y). ∃ knows A |=X[A:y] ϕ(~x, y) and
X . Whatever ∀ plays, the play is in X[A : y].

the play

We are at (∃y/
/θ(~x) )ϕ(~x, y). There is a θ(~x)-homogeneous partition X =
X0 ∪ X , and y1 , y2 such that A |=X0 [y1 :y] ϕ(~x, y) and A |=X1 [y2 :y] ϕ(~x, y).
As in the case of disjunction, player ∃ chooses y1 or y2 according to
whether some ~
x 0 in X0 satises θ(~x 0 ) or not.


Examples 4 1◦ (∀x//)(∃y//P (x) )(x = y) says that both P and its complement
have at most one element

2◦ (∀x//)(∃y//P (x) )(x 6= y) says that both P and its complement are non-

empty.

Lemma 5 If A |=X ϕ and X0 ⊆ X , then A |=X0 ϕ.
Proof.

Trivial.



Lemma 6 Every F I -sentence is rst order denable.
Proof.

Suppose

truth of

φ

φ ∈ F I.

n be the length of φ. It suces to show that
n-equivalence. Suppose therefore that M and M 0
are models and ∅ 6= I0 ⊆ I1 ⊆ ... ⊆ In is a sequence with the back-and-forth
0
property. Suppose X is a set as above. For s ∈ X let s be the result of
Let

is preserved by
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applying the back-and-forth sequence to

s ∈ X.

s.

Let

X0

be the set of all

s0

where

It suces to prove the equivalence of

M |=X φ
M 0 |=X 0 φ
for all

F I -formulas φ.

(1)
(2)

This is an easy induction on

A rst order formula is existential-universal

∃∀

φ.



if it is of the form

(∃x1 ) . . . (∃xn )(∀y1 ) . . . (∀ym )ϕ
where

ϕ is quantier-free.

∆2 if it is equivalent to an ∃∀-formula
of a ∆2 formula is

A formula is

and its negation is too. An example

(∃x1 )(∃x2 )(x1 6= x2 ) ∧ (∀x1 )(∀x2 )(∀x3 )(x1 = x2 ∨ x1 = x3 ∨ x2 = x3 ).
which says that there exactly three elements. Boolean combinations of existential formulas are, of course,

∆2 .

Lemma 7 The following conditions are equivalent for any rst order sentence ϕ:

(1) ϕ is equivalent to an ∃∀-formula.
(2) If A |= ϕ and A is the union of a chain Aα (α < β) of models, then
there is an α < β such that Aα |= ϕ.

(3) If A |= ϕ and B ⊆ A is nite, then there is C ⊆ A nite such that
B ⊆ C and for all nite D with C ⊆ D ⊆ A we have D |= ϕ.

Proof.
¬ϕ
¬ϕ

Clearly

(1) → (3) → (2).

We prove

(2) → (1).

By

(2)

the sentence

is closed under unions of chains of models. By the o±-Suszko lemma,
is universal-existential, whence

ϕ

is equivalent to an

∃∀

formula.



Theorem 8 Every FI-sentence has the nite model property.
Proof.

We prove condition (3) of Lemma 7. We use induction on
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ϕ to prove:

(?)

If

A |=X ϕ, A0 ⊆ A is nite and ∀s ∈ X (ran(s) ⊆ A0 ), then there is a
nite A1 , s.t. A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ A and for all A2 ⊆ A with A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A we
have A2 |=X ϕ.

(S1) ϕ is atomic or negated atomic.

We can choose

(S2)

A1 = A0 .

(S3)

Conjunction: Again we choose

A1 = A0 .

A |=X ϕ(~x) ∨//θ(~x) ψ(~x) and ∀s ∈ X (ran(s) ⊆
A0 ). Let X = X0 ∪ X1 such that A |=X0 ϕ(~x), A |=X1 ψ(~x) and the
partition is θ(~
x)-homogeneous. Remember that θ(~x) is ∆2 . Let A∗1 be
∗
∗
nite such that A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ A and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A implies for all s ∈ X
Disjunction: Suppose

A2 |=s θ(~x) ⇐⇒ A |=s θ(~x).
0
By induction hypothesis we have A1 for X0 and ϕ(~
x), and A11 for X1
and ψ(~
x). Let A1 = A01 ∪ A11 ∪ A∗1 . If A2 ⊆ A with A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A,
then A2 |=X0 ϕ and A2 |=X1 ψ , whence A2 |=X ϕ(~
x) ∨//θ(~x) ψ(~x). Why?

X = X0 ∪ X1 is θ(~x)-homogeneous
A2 |=s0 θ(~x), where s, s0 ∈ X , then A |=s θ(~x)
s ∈ X0 ⇐⇒ s0 ∈ X0 ].
Because

A2 [If A2 |=s θ(~x),
and A |=s0 θ(~
x) whence
in

(S4)

A |=X (∀y)ϕ(~x, y) and ∀s ∈ X (ran(s) ⊆
A0 ). Thus A |=X[A:y] ϕ(~x, y). Choose A1 = A0 . Suppose A2 ⊆ A with
A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A. Then X[A2 : y] ⊆ X[A : y], whence A2 |=X[A2 :y] ϕ(~x, y).
Now A2 |=X (∀y)ϕ(~
x, y) follows.

(S5)

A |=X (∃y//θ(~x) )ϕ(~x, y) and ∀s ∈ X (ran(s) ⊆
A0 ). Let X = X0 ∪ X1 be θ(~x)-homogeneous and y1 , y2 such that
A |=X0 [y1 :y] ϕ(~x, y) and A |=X1 [y2 :y] ϕ(~x, y). Remember that θ(~x) is ∆2 .
∗
∗
∗
Let A1 be nite such that A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ A and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A implies for
all s ∈ X
A2 |=s θ(~x) ⇐⇒ A |=s θ(~x).

Universal quantication:

Existential quantication:

A1 be such that A∗1 ∪ {y1 , y2 } ⊆ A1 ⊆ A and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A implies
A2 |=X0 [y1 :y] ϕ(~x, y) and A2 |=X1 [y2 :y] ϕ(~x, y). Now A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A
implies A2 |= (∃y/
/θ(~x) )ϕ(~x, y). Why? Because X = X0 ∪ X1 is θ(~x)homogeneous in A2 [If A2 |=s θ(~
x), A2 |=s0 θ(~x), where s, s0 ∈ X ,
then A |=s θ(~
x) and A |=s0 θ(~x) whence s ∈ X0 ⇐⇒ s0 ∈ X0 .] and
A2 |=X0 [y1 :y] ϕ(~x, y), A2 |=X1 [y2 :y] ϕ(~x, y).
Let
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The above theorem has an alternative proof using the concept of a Dstructure (see [6, 7, 8, 9], which build on [1]).

Example 9 The sentence
(∀x//)(∃y//x=x )(x ≤ y)

says that the linear order ≤ has a last element. It has no negation in FI as
the negation does not have the nite model property.
The nite model property would be true even if we allowed any

θ

//θ .

to occur in

Let

F I(∃∀)

However, allowing

∃∀-formulas θ

∆2 formula

leads us to new avenues:

be this generalization.

Theorem 10 F I(∃∀) does not have the nite model property.
Proof.

ϕ

Let

be the sentence

(∀x//)(∃y//ψ(x) )(y 6= x)
where

ψ(x)

is the

∃∀-formula
x = 0 ∨ (∃u)(∀v)(v ≤ u).

The vocabulary consists of
of

ϕ

≤

and the constant

0.

Let

ϕ0

be the conjunction

and the universal (hence FI) axioms of linear order.
hω, ≤, 0i |= ϕ0 . The task of ∃ is choose y 6= x knowing only whether

Claim 1
ψ(x)

is true or not. She argues as follows: If I am told

it is because

ψ(x)

x = 0,

so I choose

is not true, I know

Claim 2 ϕ0

x 6= 0,

y = 1.

is true, I know

If, on the other hand, I am told that

so I choose

has no nite models.

ψ(x)

y = 0.
A = hA, ≤, 0i

Suppose

were one.

Now

x. So ∃ has no way of choosing y 6= x on the
ψ(x) is true or not. More formally, suppose A |=X ϕ0 , where
X = {∅}. Then A |=X[A:x] (∃y//ψ(x) )(y 6= x). Let X[A : x] = X0 ∪ X1 be a
ψ(x)- homogeneous partition and y0 , y1 ∈ A such that A |=X0 [y0 :y] y 6= x and
A |=X1 [y1 :y] y 6= x. Since ψ(x) is always true, X0 = ∅ or X1 = ∅. Say X1 = ∅.
Thus hx, y0 i ∈ X0 , whence A |=X0 [y0 :y] y = x, a contradiction.

ψ(x)

is true independently of

basis of whether

10

F I(F O) denote the extension of F I where any rst-order θ is allowed
to occur in /
/θ . Lemma 2 implies that F I(F O) contains all of rst-order logic.
Let F I(IF ) denote the extension of F I where any θ from IF-logic is allowed
to occur in /
/θ . We know that non-well-foundedness can be expressed in the
IF-logic. Lemma 2 implies that F I(IF ) can express also well-foundedness.
Thus F I(IF ) is not included in IF-logic.
The F I as we have dened it turns out to be translatable into rst-order
Let

logic:

Theorem 11 Every FI-sentence is equivalent to an ∃∀-sentence, and vice
versa, every ∃∀-sentence is equivalent to an FI-sentence.

Proof.

One direction follows from Theorem 8. For the converse implica-

tion it suces to notice that following are equivalent:

A |= (∃x1 ) . . . (∃xn )(∀y1 ) . . . (∀ym )ϕ
A |={∅} (∃x1 //) · · · (∃xn //)(∀y1 //) . . . (∀ym //)ϕ0 ,
ϕ is obtained
θ(~x) ∨ //θ(~x),ψ(~x) ψ(~x).
where

from

ϕ

by replacing each disjunction

Note that

occur in connection with

//.

φ

θ(~x) ∨ ψ(~x)

by

is quantier-free, so its subformulas can

We assume that

∃

knows her own strategy.



Theorem 12 F I has an exponential compression relative to rst order ∃∀
logic.

Proof.
merals.

0≤y<

Consider the structure

A

whose domain consists of all binary nu2n . Of course

mod

The predicate C(x, y) means that y = x + 1
2n . The predicate Pi (x) for i ≤ n means that the

i-th digit of x from
the right is 1. Consider the formula θ = (∀x)(∃y/
/P1 (x), ..., Pn (x))C(x, y).
The formula says that ∃ can choose y knowing only the truth values of
Pi (x) : i ≤ n. θ is true in A, and remains true if we only take integers
< 2n . But it is not true in any sub-structure of size < 2n . Thus any ∃∀
n
formula which was equivalent to θ would have to have at least 2 quantiers.

Vθ we do not
φ = (∀x)(∃y)(∀z)([ i≤n Pi (x) ↔

However, note that if we use full rst order logic to express
need exponential growth. For the formula
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Pi (z)] → C(z, y)) is equivalent to θ. If ∀ is allowed to change his move after
∃ has played hers then she is in eect restricted to what she could have done
had she known

only

the values of the booleans.

We now show that every model of a FI-formula has a nite submodel of
at most exponential size.

Theorem 13 Let A |= ϕ where the logical complexity of ϕ is n. Then A has
a submodel B of ϕ of size at most n2n .

Proof.:

Assume that

ϕ

is written so that all negations apply only to atoms,

∃, ∀, ∨, ∧ only. Eloise has a
winning strategy for the game corresponding to ϕ. For each move ∃y of
Eloise, consider the moves ∀x/
/P (x) in whose scope y lies. There are at most
n of such predicates P (x) and the value of y is determined by the truth
0
values of these P (x). (y may be determined also by previous moves y of
Eloise, but these are also determined by these booleans P and therefore by
all booleans, whether y is in their scope or not.) So consider the set V of
all boolean vectors governing any move of Eloise. The cardinality of V is at
n
most 2 . For each move ∃yi of Eloise, her strategy gives a function fi from
V into A, the domain of A. Since Eloise has at most n moves, there are at
most n functions, and the range of all these functions gives us a subset of A
n
of size at most n2 . Let this subset be B .
Consider the modied game where Abelard is allowed to move in A but
Eloise is restricted to move in B . Clearly Eloise is free to use her former
so that

ϕ

is constructed from literals using

winning strategy and wins. Consider now a further restriction where Abelard
is also restricted to

B.

But that means that if
n
most n2 and B |= ϕ.

Surely this does not harm Eloise and she still wins.

B

is the submodel corresponding to

B,

its size is at


∃∀
θ ∨ ∃x∀y(y =
M . Then M

This result does not imply an exponential translation of FI logic into
logic, but makes it highly likely. Consider an arbitrary formula

x).

θ is consistent, consider any of its models
is also a model of θ ∨ ∃x∀y(y = x). Now if we take any 1-element submodel
of M , it is a model of θ ∨ ∃x∀y(y = x), but we would not thereby expect
θ ∨ ∃x∀y(y = x) to have a translation into an ∃∀ formula.
Assuming that

Theorem 14 F I(F O) = F O.
12
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